AG Heinzelmann, 24.10.2025 How to be a non-consequentialist and still save the greater number - Pre-read paper

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Many people agree that other things being equal, agents who have the option of saving either a smaller or a greater number of different people have a duty to save the greater number. While consequentialists have an easy time vindicating this prima facie plausible assumption, it is far from obvious that it can be given a deontological rationale (and it also has been famously rejected by a number of deontologists). After criticising some existing deontological attempts to defend the duty to save the greater number, I present a new proposal, which appeals to a general principle about the aggregation of normative reasons. I defend this principle against objections and show how it can be combined with an attractive account of moral rights as preventers of aggregation, which delivers non-aggregationist verdicts in cases where these seem pre-theoretically plausible.

Benjamin Kiesewetter is Professor of Practical Philosophy at Bielefeld University, where he leads the ERC‑funded research project “The Structure of Normativity”. He received the Deutscher Preis für Philosophie in 2024 for his excellent work on normativity. His philosophical work focuses on foundational issues in metaethics, normative ethics, and the theory of rationality, exploring questions such as the structure of normativity, the nature of reasons and rationality, non‑consequentialism, and ethical pluralism. In applied philosophy, he engages with topics like children’s rights, climate ethics, democratic theory, and intergenerational justice. He is especially known for his book “The Normativity of Rationality” published by the Oxford University Press in 2017.